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Abstract
Hooper, Schuyler R. Culture, Macroeconomic Stabilizations and Economic Growth.
This paper argues that culture is the underlying determinant causing the delays and
massive social costs sometimes seen as countries attempt to stabilize after experiencing
external shocks. While there have been significant ties between culture and economic
performance in the past, as in Tabellini (2008) and Licht et al. (2007), this paper argues that
culture matters more during periods of disequilibrium than it does during times of equilibrium.
The empirical methodology for this paper closely mirrors that of Rodrik (1999), in which
he proposed that latent social conflicts and poor institutions of conflict management were the
reasons for delayed adjustments to external shocks. The dependent variable for all regressions
is the difference between the change in growth from 1975‐1990 to 1960‐1975. This was the
same dependent variable Rodrik (1999) used for his regressions, reasoning that the world
economy during the 1970s was very turbulent and filled with external shocks. The independent
variables include terms of trade shocks, and Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions. The three main
Cultural Dimensions that are considered in this paper are Power Distance, Individualism and
Uncertainty Avoidance. Cultural variables present significant issues in terms of endogeneity,
which is why instrumental variables will be used in the regressions when possible.
A theoretical model, with components drawn from Alesina and Drazen (1991),
supplements the empirical model. Their model has been modified to account for relative
income preferences in an attempt to show the significance of the Power Distance variable.
Results show that countries with the largest drops in growth after 1975 were those that
had cultural aspects that caused delayed adjustments to external shocks that they faced.
Particularly, high scores for Power Distance, low scores for Individualism and high scores for
Uncertainty Avoidance translated to poor economic performance after external shocks.
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Chapter One
Introduction

A. The Phenomenon of Growth Collapses
In late 1997, Eastern Asia experienced a tough financial crisis during which multiple
countries saw their currencies deteriorate and sought help from the IMF. In Indonesia, the
Rupiah lost over 80% of its value and Dictator Suharto was forced from power. South Korea
suffered a similar fate, the value of the Won declined 53% and a few of its major electronics
and car companies (some of the largest in the world) needed emergency bailouts. 1 While this
was a very rough time for both countries, their recovery periods were quite different. As seen in
the graph of GDP growth for the two countries (Figure 1), South Korea restored growth much
more quickly than Indonesia. Particularly, the growth between 1998‐1999 (the year after the
major devaluation), South Korea grew at a rate of over 8%. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s growth rate
was still negative with a rate of ‐0.58%. Also, after Indonesia did restore growth somewhat, it
only grew at an average of 3% between 1999 and 2003, much less than the 6% average that it
had been experiencing in the years leading up to the crisis. While South Korea also was not able
to quite reach its level of previous growth of slightly over 6%, it did make it back to just under
5% for the period 1999‐2003. This idea is further illustrated in Figure 2, a graph of the
unemployment rates in both countries for the 5 year period after 1998. On this graph, the
divergence between Indonesia and South Korea is much more obvious.
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Figure 1: A graph of GDP growth from 1994‐2003 for South Korea and Indonesia.

One thing that often goes overlooked when trying to explain the reasons for these two
countries experiencing two very different fates after a similar initial shock is the response of
each country’s citizens. The citizens of South Korea waited in line for hours in order to donate
their personal treasures of gold and jewelry. South Korea was able to use these possessions to
help rebuild their foreign reserves. Having seen the success of this program, Indonesia tried to
replicate it. The first person to donate her gold was Dictator Suharto's daughter and she was
promptly booed by the people of Indonesia, as they were displeased by the amount of jewelry
she had obtained. This paper considers whether culture plays a role in how countries respond
to economic shocks since, as seen in the cases of South Korea and Indonesia, the way in which a
country responds to shocks can have a lasting effect on the growth rate and other key
economic indicators.
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Figure 2: A graph of the unemployment rate from 1998‐2003 for South Korea and Indonesia.

As shown in the example above, this paper is motivated by the fact that many countries
around the world experience growth collapses—meaning that they appear to be growing at a
steady rate and then all of a sudden experience a lengthy period of decreased growth. There
has been some research that attributes these growth collapses to external shocks—events that
occur outside a country’s control but have a significant effect (positive or negative) on one or
more economic variables. In this literature, namely articles by Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and
Summers (1993) and Raddatz (2007), the focus is on negative external shocks. The findings of
these articles, as well as others, such as Rodrik (1999), show that external shocks by themselves
could not possibly cause the corresponding growth collapse. There must be another variable
interacting with the external shocks that cause this phenomenon.
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B. Culture, External Shocks and Growth
This paper presents the hypothesis that culture determines whether a country will
respond well to an external shock or poorly. An external shock can be characterized by a short
and small or non‐existent growth decline while a poor response to an external shock would be a
long period of possibly ten or more years of decreased growth. The channel through which
these cultural variables will effect growth is by delaying necessary adjustments in fiscal policy.
For instance, when a country experiences a terms of trade shock—a sharp increase in the price
of its imports or drop in price in its exports—there are a set of a “textbook” adjustments for this
economy to undertake. Rodrik (1999) provides a vivid illustration of these adjustments and
presents some questions that countries must ask when altering their fiscal policy:
To fix ideas, think of an economy that is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
with a drop in the price of its main export. The textbook prescription for this
economy is a combination of expenditure‐switching and expenditure‐reducing
policies—a devaluation and fiscal retrenchment. But the precise manner in
which these policy changes are administered can have significant distributional
implications. Should the devaluation be accompanied by wage controls? Should
import tariffs be raised? Should the fiscal retrenchment take place through
spending cuts or tax increases? If spending is to be cut, which types of
expenditure should bear the brunt of the cuts?

Hence, it is imperative that countries can answer these questions in a timely matter in
order to successfully respond to an exogenous shock. If they cannot do so, the social costs of
delayed stabilization increase over time and can be quite large. One common problem to delay
is the level of short term debt held by the government increases notably, leading to much
higher interest payments and leaving the country exposed to a debt crisis.
The cultural variables tested for this hypothesis are Geert Hofstede’s Cultural
Dimensions which incorporate four main variables: Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty
4

Avoidance and Masculinity. This paper hypothesizes that Power Distance, Individualism and
Uncertainty Avoidance will have significant effects on growth when interacted with external
shocks. Specifically, this paper tests the hypothesis that countries that have high Power
Distance scores (are more adverse to changes in status), lower Individualism scores (are more
integrated into groups) and low Uncertainty Avoidance scores (are less adverse to uncertainty
and risk), will not respond as well to external shocks and will experience growth collapses.
The theory behind the idea that these cultural variables potentially cause delays extends
from previous work by Alesina and Drazen (1991) and the theoretical model proposed in this
paper. In their article, Alesina and Drazen note that stabilizations are almost always delayed,
yet they contend that if nothing were holding up the bargaining process, stabilizations would
occur immediately. They propose that “Delays in stabilization arise due to a political stalemate
over distribution.” This paper theorizes that the underlying culture in a country is what causes
these political stalemates to vary in length. For example, a country that has a higher
Individualism score is more likely to have a shorter delay since the parties that are bargaining
are more concerned about their own benefit. A lower Individualism score would lead to longer
delays since the parties that are bargaining are doing so on behalf of a group and need to
consider different things that will promote the total welfare of the group.
The theoretical model in this paper views the decision to delay or concede from the
perspective of countries with different Power Distance scores. The model adopts some
elements directly from Alesina and Drazen and focuses on a war of attrition with increasing
costs to delay. Since the people in countries with higher Power Distance scores are more
conscious of their own status, the model shows that they will likely not concede since they have
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a higher preference for relative income. The logic behind this is that if they do concede, there is
a chance that the other party will delay, in which case the other party will come out the
“winner”. Thus, the only viable option for each party is to delay, making the cooperative
equilibrium unstable.
From an empirical perspective, the period used to determine whether countries
experienced growth collapses will be 1960‐1989. The dependent variable will be the change in
growth from the period 1960‐1975 and 1975‐1989. 1975 is chosen as a break point since the
1970s were rife with external shocks and thus, this represents a good midpoint. This portion of
the analysis mirrors that of Rodrik (1999).

C. Results and Outline
The results show that the countries that experienced growth collapses for a given size
external shock generally had low Individualism scores, high Power Distance scores and high
Uncertainty Avoidance scores. However, Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance do not
pass all of the robustness tests that the variables are put through. Individualism not only passes
these tests but also shows up as more significant than a measure democracy.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 gives an example and background
information on delayed stabilizations and culture. Chapter 3 gives a model and presents the
theory outlining how culture delays stabilizations. Following that, Chapter 4 presents the
sources of data and their characteristics. Chapter 5 provides the empirical results and also
discusses these results. Lastly, Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks.
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Chapter Two
Delayed Stabilizations and How They Occur

A. The Need for a Fiscal Change
In 1973 the United States faced an oil embargo from the Arab members of OPEC as well
as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia after the US decided to continue supplying the Israeli army with
weapons. While the embargo only lasted for six months, it had a significant impact on the
economy. As seen in figure 3, the embargo lead to a sharp decrease in aggregate supply
through increased costs of production and transportation, causing a period of stagflation.
Assuming the economy was at its natural rate of output, in the short run the economy would
move from point to A to point B. Ideally, this is when the government would choose to fight
inflation or unemployment, since the consequences to inaction are even worse and are
demonstrated in Figure 3. In the medium run, as the expected price level rises to match the
increased rate of inflation, wages and prices increase and the aggregate supply curve shifts
even further to the left until the economy reaches its new equilibrium level of output and
unemployment. 2
In the case of the United States in the early 1970s, the government chose to combat
unemployment. The fiscal policy response was to decrease government spending slightly while
offering a large tax cut. However, the question arose, as it always does, who will benefit the
most from the tax cut? Will it be progressive and help the poor more than the rich? Will it be a
flat rate or fixed dollar amount? Will it be regressive? Which areas of government spending will
2

This theory is adopted from the textbook Macroeconomics by Blanchard, 5th Edition p. 143 in order to show the
effects of an oil shock on the macroeconomy.
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Figure 3: A graph of the medium run effects of an oil supply shock on the macroeconomy.

be cut? Every government has to deal with these issues when faced with an external shock. In
most cases, the bargaining over these stabilizations can take a long time and get ugly, as there
are significant distributional consequences to the results. A change in taxes or government
spending can completely alter many people’s economic status. As the bargaining time
increases, the social costs increase since the problem is not being resolved and likely more
problems are arising as a result.

B. The Theory Behind Delayed Stabilizations
Alesina and Drazen (1991) explain why macroeconomic adjustments can take so long
and illustrate some common characteristics of delayed adjustments. They begin their article by
outlining common features that they have noticed in their research and then present a model
that explains this behavior. The first common feature of stabilizations that they note is:
1. There is an agreement on the need for a fiscal change but a political stalemate over
how the burden of higher taxes or expenditure cuts should be allocated. (p. 1172)
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Since there is almost always a need for fiscal change after an external shock, this observation
ties in closely with the theory from this paper. However, as Alesina and Drazen note, there is
rarely an instant agreement of how the burden of stabilization will be distributed since no
group wants to risk bearing the majority of the cost. In this context, Alesina and Drazen use
examples from France and Britain from the post World War I period to demonstrate their point,
but it is also easy to see this scenario played out in the United States political landscape. The
Democrats generally argue for lower taxes for the lower and middle classes and higher taxes for
the rich, with the Republicans generally contending for lower taxes for the upper class and a
less progressive tax system. Often these debates can wage on in Congress for many months and
even years. Sometimes, the debate will last until one party can gain a powerful majority in the
House and Senate. This leads to Alesina and Drazen’s second common feature of delayed
stabilizations:
2. When stabilization occurs, it coincides with a political consolidation. Often, one side
becomes politically dominant. The burden of stabilization is sometimes quite
unequal, with the politically weaker groups bearing a larger burden. (p.1173)
This feature is commonplace around the world in both democratic and non‐democratic
governments. If one group has an overwhelming majority power, it can deflect the burden of
adjustment away from their political group. For instance, this could occur when one political
party has a majority in a democratic government or when there is a powerful dictator. Both
scenarios likely lead to one group having to pay more than the other. When one group can
force another to bear a larger portion of the costs to stabilization, the outcome is generally not
optimal, but it is usually better than if both parties delayed for a long time, which Alesina and
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Drazen show is very costly in their model. This leads to the final common characteristic
presented by Alesina and Drazen:
3. Successful stabilizations are usually preceded by several failed attempts. Often a
previous program appears to be similar to the successful one. (p. 1174)
This is because of the assumption that there are rising costs of delaying. As the costs increase, a
party may have to settle for a deal that it previously thought was unacceptable due to the fact
that they cannot afford to delay any longer. Unfortunately, if they had just taken the earlier
deal the costs would have been a lot lower. However, since Alesina and Drazen create their
model from a war of attrition, the likely outcome will result in there being one “winner” and
one “loser”, with the loser bearing an unequal portion of the cost of adjustment. If one party
concedes while the other delays, the party that concedes is the loser. This is why it is
unappealing to concede until it is absolutely necessary to do so.
These three common characteristics help make up the model presented in Alesina and
Drazen’s article. In this model, they assume that a government is running a budget deficit and it
needs to raise taxes to bring the deficit to zero. It is also assumed that before the stabilization,
the government is limited to highly inefficient and distortionary methods of public finance.
Thus, there is a welfare loss associated with the rise in the level of government debt. There is
also a cost for different groups in the country to lobby in order to prevent the burden of
stabilization being placed on them. Hence, there are two main costs to delay, the increasing
government debt that must be paid back along with any interest associated with it, and the
increasing costs of lobbying to avoid bearing the burden of taxation. Alesina and Drazen view
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these increasing costs as becoming very high as time goes on and conclude that delayed
stabilizations are significantly more costly than quick or immediate stabilizations.

C. Rodrik’s Extension of This Theory
Rodrik (1999) takes a similar view on the reasons for delayed stabilization and the
outcomes. He claims latent social conflicts and institutions of conflict management are the
proxies for delay and those countries that have higher levels of social conflict and weaker
institutions of conflict management will experience delays to stabilization. He gives the
following argument:
First, the groups are less likely to cooperate when it is difficult to coordinate on a
‘fair’ distribution of resources. This will be the case in societies that are highly
polarized—where, using my terminology, latent social conflict is high. Second,
the non‐cooperative strategy will appear more appealing when the potential
return to unilateral action is high—that is, when it is possible to exclude other
groups from the pie. This possibility is most salient when the society’s
institutions of conflict management are weak…..
These appear to be fairly reasonable assumptions. However, if one group believes that they can
exclude another from the pie, and they successfully can, Alesina and Drazen contend that this
would make the delay shorter, as noted in point number two in the common feature of delays
above. It appears that Rodrik believes that delays are only likely to happen if there are high
levels of latent social conflict and weak institutions of conflict management. Clearly there is a
slight disconnect in theory between Rodrik and Alesina and Drazen. Hence, it may be that
another set of variables other than social conflicts or institutions of conflict management
determine the length of delay of stabilizations. This paper proposes that those variables are
cultural variables.
11

D. Background on Culture
It is nearly impossible to pinpoint an accurate definition of the term “culture”. In a paper
by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), they define culture as "those customary beliefs and
values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to
generation." Though others, such as Putnam (1995), would counter this definition with
examples of how culture can possibly change over shorter periods of time as he argued in his
article regarding America’s declining social capital. As hard as culture is to define, it is even
harder to quantify. On top of that, culture is endogenous, so anyone testing it must circumvent
that barrier as well. Still, even with all these issues, culture has found its place in economic
literature.
The idea of culture influencing growth is certainly not a new one. In fact there is a large
literature that focuses on the idea that culture and institutions are correlated and that these in
turn determine growth. While it is extremely difficult to establish a causation running from
culture to institutions, multiple economists such as Tabellini (2008) and Licht et al. (2007) have
provided evidence for this causation. Furthermore Glaeser et al. (2004) actually tried to debunk
the possibility that institutions could form culture, citing flaws in the instrumental variables
used in many institution papers. Others, such as Stulz et al. (2003) have shown the specific
institutions in which culture has influenced. Lastly, some economists have even attempted to
narrow down growth to one cultural variable, such as in Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010)
when they focused on Individualism/Collectivism as a channel for growth.
Given all of this research regarding culture and growth, it is plausible that culture
matters to growth, but it matters more during times of disequilibrium. Thus, this paper tests
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culture in framework of Rodrik (1999) to determine whether culture can explain sustained
periods of slow growth.
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Chapter Three
Theoretical Model
A. Background and Notes about Model
The theoretical model for this paper adopts key elements from the model presented in
Alesina and Drazen (1991). The model introduced by Alesina and Drazen focuses on a war of
attrition, in which there are two parties that acknowledge a need for a fiscal policy change due
to a bad government policy, but cannot agree on how the burden of change will be distributed.
However, by delaying the change in policy, the total social cost increases by keeping the bad
policy for a longer time. The stabilization process can be viewed from the angle of an external
shock, rather than of a bad government policy, with similar results.
To an extent, Rodrik (1999) views the problem in a similar manner. He claims that the
best outcome for both groups is to concede immediately in order bear the least social cost
possible. As previously noted, Rodrik focuses on high latent social conflicts and weak
institutions of conflict management as reasons for delay.
The model is altered slightly to include a preference for income, in terms of whether a
party is more concerned with its own income or its relative income to the other party. The
aspect of political cost is also dropped from the model. In Alesina and Drazen’s model, political
costs include paying increasing amounts for lobbying activities over time. The cost of delay is
instead represented by a discount rate that includes the probability of a negative shock.

14

B. Model Presentation
This model is designed to be a game played repeatedly, with increasing costs after each
round. In this model, the cost of an immediate adjustment is ty, where t is the tax rate and y is
income. As explained previously, there is an increased cost to delaying adjustment. This cost is
represented by a factor of λ, where λ > 1. Thus, the cost of a delayed adjustment is λty.
There are two political parties or interest groups. The goal for both parties is to avoid
bearing the majority of the cost of adjustment. In this case, if one party concedes and the other
party delays, the conceding party has to pay a disproportionate amount of the cost of
adjustment. The conceding party will pay αty, where α > ½ and the delaying party will pay
(1‐α)ty.
We can then define the income that one of the parties receives (after one round) as a function
of both parties’ strategies, where y1 = y1(s1,s2) and s1 denotes the strategy of party one. Hence,
the following possible outcomes can occur:
Both Concede:

y1(C,C) = 1

Both Delay:

y1(D,D) = 1

Party one Concedes, Party two Delays:
Party one Delays, Party two Concedes:

y1(C,D) = 1
y1(D,C) = 1

1

For simplicity, let y1(C,C) = a, y1(C,D) = b, y1(D,C) =c and y1(D,D) =d.
The game is played repeatedly, with a discount rate of r.

In this model, the cooperative equilibrium is S = (C,C) and the non‐cooperative
equilibrium is S = (D,D). The cooperative equilibrium is sustainable if the gain from delay while
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the other party cooperates (c‐a), is less than the difference in payoff between the cooperative
and non‐cooperative equilibriums

).

Next, the parties’ income preferences are accounted for when determining the final payoffs.
Party one’s payoff can be viewed as a function of both parties’ incomes:
1(y1,y2)

= 1

Where
0,1 and is a measure of income preference. If γ = 0, only your own income
matters. If γ = 1, only your relative income matters.
Then, the cooperative equilibrium, S, yields the following payoffs:
,

1

, 1

In this case, the cooperative equilibrium becomes unstable for large values of gamma,
since the coefficient of (1‐γ) approaches 0. This means that the best payoff possible for parties
with gamma values close to 1 is approximately 0 if they cooperate (if party one cooperates and
party two delays, party one has a negative payoff due to increased inequality). Thus, in
countries where there is a heavy importance on relative income, such as in those with high
Power Distance scores; parties will struggle to reach a cooperative equilibrium. The non‐
cooperative equilibrium becomes the sustainable equilibrium since there is a 50 percent chance
that a party will receive a positive payoff and a 50 percent chance the payoff will be
approximately zero. At the non‐cooperative equilibrium there is a total social loss of 2(a‐d) in
comparison to the cooperative equilibrium.
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C. How Culture Causes Delays of Stabilization
The above model explains how countries with high Power Distance scores will
experience delayed stabilizations. Since the people in countries with higher Power Distance are
more status conscious, they are more concerned about falling in status than they are with gains
in their own income. This translates to a high preference for relative income. As seen in the
model, people who have a very high preference for relative income are unlikely to concede.
Thus, delayed stabilizations occur since both bargaining parties always delay.
Though there is no model for Individualism, the theory behind it is much simpler than
Power Distance. According to Hofstede, countries with high Individualism scores prefer to make
individual decisions rather than group decisions. The people in countries with high
Individualism scores also make decisions on behalf of themselves and their immediate family,
not a larger group or extended family. Thus, when it comes to bargaining, a deal is struck
quickly since the people are making decisions on their own behalf and do not have to worry
about the welfare of a larger group.
The theory surrounding Uncertainty Avoidance is also fairly simple. Since people in
countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance scores are more adverse to risk and worry more
about the future, they are more likely to strike a deal quickly. Low Uncertainty Avoidance
scores are associated with more risk taking and less worry about the future, which translates
into delays when bargaining.
In order to better understand how these cultural variables delay stabilizations, an
example using Nigeria and Switzerland can be used. Switzerland has a low Power Distance score
of 34, a high Individualism score of 68 and an average Uncertainty Avoidance score of 58.
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Nigeria, on the other hand, has a high Power Distance of 77, a low Individualism score of 20 and
a low Uncertainty Avoidance score of 30. Both countries have a multi‐party government that is
elected by the people. Now, suppose that both countries experience a negative terms of trade
shock and wish to stabilize using the “textbook” policies outlined in Chapter 1. When bargaining
over who will bear the tax increases, Switzerland will be able to execute the adjustment quicker
than Nigeria for multiple reasons. First, the people of Switzerland have a larger preference for
personal income rather than relative income. Because of this, the bargaining parties are most
likely to concede since that is the solution that yields the highest benefits for all. Secondly, the
bargaining parties are not constrained by having to worry about others when bargaining since
they are highly Individualistic. Thirdly, an average Uncertainty Avoidance score may mean that
they delay slightly, but it is far from low, so they will not delay for a significant amount of time.
In Nigeria, on the other hand, the bargainers are almost entirely concerned with relative
income, which means that they will not want to concede in fear that the other party will delay
and they will be the “losers”. They also have to worry about bargaining on the behalf of larger
groups since it is harder to find a deal that pleases everyone. Lastly, Nigerians are less
concerned about the future or opposed to risk, therefore there is not a major reason that they
should concede earlier rather than later. When looking at the growth results that both
countries experienced, this story proves to be quite accurate. Switzerland experienced a 1.16%
higher growth rate in 1975‐1989 than in 1960‐1975. This compares well to the average of
‐0.12%. Nigeria, however, suffered a decline of 4.29% in growth over the same timeframe,
showing that culture does make a difference.
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Chapter Four
Explanations and Sources of Data
A. Dependent Variable: Change in Growth
The dependent variable for this study is the average GDP per capita growth from 1975‐
1989 minus the average GDP per capita growth from 1960‐1975. Rodrik (1999) uses this same
measure as his dependent variable in his article. He uses the period from 1975‐1989 to allow
for more observations, but claims that the results are the same when using 1990 instead. While
that same issue does not appear with the data in this paper, the same measure is used anyway
for the purpose of consistency so the results can be compared in the end. This data comes from
the Penn World Tables version 6.3 and the GDP per capita is measured in 2001 US Dollars. In
the results section, this term will be called dgrowth.

B. External Shocks
The data for terms of trade and openness come from the Global Development Network
Growth Database. 3 The measure of terms of trade is measured by the price of exports divided
by the price of imports in a given country. Openness is measured by taking the exports of a
country plus its imports and dividing this number the country’s GDP.
Terms of trade shocks are chosen as the measure of external shocks for multiple
reasons. One of the main reasons is that Rodrik (1999) uses them in his paper as his measure of
external shocks. Also, as noted in Rodrik’s article, the 1970s were rife with terms of trade

3

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701055~pagePK:642148
25~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#1%29 (created on June 1, 2001)
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shocks, so there is a good sample period in which to measure the long term effects of these
shocks. Lastly, the measure of terms of trade is useful since it incorporates changes in
economies themselves. For example, after experiencing a major shock once, governments will
often try to implement preventative measures from it happening again. Also, since shocks
usually lead to a higher price of a good (or set of goods), this creates an incentive for lower cost
substitute goods to enter the market. This has happened in the present world economy with
oil. An article in The Economist (2011) explains this change well, “The rich world is less
vulnerable now [to an oil shock] because it has substantially reduced the amount of oil used per
unit of output. America’s economy in 2009 was more than twice as large in real terms as in
1980. Yet over that period America’s oil consumption rose on slightly, from 17.4m b/d to
17.8m. Europe actually used less oil in 2009 than in 1980, even though its economy had grown.”
The article also explains how even emerging economies are also less susceptible to an oil shock
due to the fact that manufacturing is more efficient and service industries are more prominent.
Since terms of trade is a measure of prices, it adjusts accordingly to any swings in export or
import prices, whether they are large or small. Thus, any changes in economies themselves
from the sample period of 1960‐1989 would have been captured in the measure of terms of
trade.
There are two types of terms of trade shocks used in this paper. The first focuses on a
one time change in terms of trade. This is measured by taking the average terms of trade over
two subsequent five year periods and calculating the percentage change between them. This
value is then multiplied by the average openness of the first five year period. The formula for
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the terms of trade shock employed in this paper uses the periods 1970‐1974 and 1975‐1979.
The formula for this shock is:

Where tot7579 represents the average terms of trade over the period 1975‐1979 and open7579
represents the average openness over the period 1975‐1979. This shock is referred to as
ashock1 in the results section.
In order to accurately explain the effects of one of these shocks, the absolute value of
the shock may be taken. By doing this, it implies that all terms of trade shocks (even positive
ones) will have a negative effect on growth. The reasoning behind this comes from Tornell and
Lane (1999) in an article that they propose an idea called the “Voracity effect”. In this paper,
Tornell and Lane model an economy with two sectors, a formal sector and shadow sector. They
claim that an increase in the rate of return in the formal sector actually reduces growth. The
increase in the rate of return leads to each group attempting to grab a larger share of national
wealth by demanding more transfers. This attempt to grab wealth is then reflected in higher
taxation in the formal sector, which results in moving capital to the informal sector where it is
safe from taxation. This transfer of capital is what causes the reduction in growth. Rodrik (1999)
also cites this article to explain why he treats all shocks as negative shocks as well.
The second type of terms of trade shock used in this paper measures the volatility of
terms of trade. It is the primary measure that Rodrik uses in his article as well. It is calculated by
taking the standard deviation of the first log differences of terms of trade for the years 1971‐
1980 and then multiplying this value by the average exports as a percentage of GDP for the five
year period 1970‐1974. This shock is referred to as totshock2 in the results section.
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C. Culture
Using culture as an independent variable presents a few difficult obstacles. The first of
which is the issue of quantification. While much progress has been made in this regard, there is
still not a foolproof solution to this problem. Data from the World Values Survey, which has
attempted to turned into culture variables by some, such as Shalom Schwartz, has subsequently
been applied to economics as in Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007). Other economists
have relied on older data from sources such as Geert Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions, which is
the data that this paper uses. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions were chosen since they have
been tested over a period of over 40 years and have 80 observations (when including countries
with regional values), which is more than other data sets. These Dimensions are taken from his
website. 4 There are five dimensions in total: Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity,
Uncertainty Avoidance Index and Long Term Orientation. However, Long Term Orientation is
not used in this study due to the fact that there are only 23 observations. Masculinity is also
neglected for this study due to issues surrounding its practicality for potential theory. The
Cultural Dimensions were calculated using survey data from IBM over the period of 1967‐1973.
Two surveys were conducted, one in the period of 1967‐1969 and one in 1971‐1973 among IBM
employees in 39 different countries. In 2001, Hofstede published a second edition of his book
Culture's Consequences in which he claims the earlier data has been validated by more recent
subsequent studies. The number of observations had also increased to 74 (including three
regions) by 2001. The three dimensions used in this paper are discussed further in detail below.

4

http://www.geert‐hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php
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The variable of Power Distance (PDI) deals with the basic issue of income inequality.
Power Distance measures the amount of inequality that a person in a given country expects.
Countries with high Power Distance scores expect a lot of inequality, while countries with low
scores expect very low amounts of inequality. Another attribute associated with Power
Distance is class consciousness. Countries with high Power Distance scores generally have a
better understanding of their own position on the order of inequality. The index ranges from 11
(Austria) to 104 (Malaysia).
The next measure of culture used, Individualism (IDV), measures the extent to which
individuals are integrated into groups. A higher Individualism score is associated with more of
an “everyone for themselves” mentality. Also, Hofstede explains that the people in higher
Individualism countries generally believe that individual decisions are considered better than
group decisions. He also notes that Individualism is negatively correlated with Power Distance.
The scale for Individualism runs from 6 (Guatemala) to 91 (United States).
The final measure, Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), measures the tolerance that a people in
a country have for uncertainty. The IBM survey used three indicators to measure this: rule
orientation, employment stability and stress. Hofstede associates a high Uncertainty Avoidance
score with less risk‐taking and a greater fear of failure. People in these countries also have a
higher anxiety level and worry more about the future. This index runs from 8 (Singapore) to 112
(Greece).
The other main issue that arises when working with culture stems from the fact that
culture is endogenous. It is difficult to prove causation from culture to growth when it could
also be plausible that economic growth causes different cultural traits to appear. This issue is
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easier to control for than quantification issues by using linguistic instruments in order to
decrease measurement error. The idea of using linguistic instruments for measures of culture
comes from the Sapir‐Whorf hypothesis, which states that language and culture constitute one
another. The instruments for this paper come from Kashima and Kashima (1998).
The first instrument that they propose is Pronoun Drop. They explain this measure as
“An explicit use of "I" (i.e., first‐person singular deictic pronoun) signals that the person is
highlighted as a figure against the speech context that constitutes the ground; its absence
reduces the prominence of the speaker's person, thus reducing the figure‐ground
differentiation. “ Thus, for example, the absence of the use of “I” in English would constitute a
Pronoun Drop. In the data set, 1=Yes (there is a Pronoun Drop) and 0=No (there is not).
Kashima and Kashima claim that Pronoun Drop is highly correlated with the Individualism
cultural variable. In fact, Pronoun Drop has been used as an instrument for Individualism in
previous economics papers such as Tabellini (2008) and Licht et al. (2007).
The other language instrument that comes from Kashima and Kashima (1998) is the use
of multiple second‐person singular pronouns. In this paper, this instrument will be called T‐V
Differentiation (stemming from tu and vos in Latin). Kashima and Kashima give this explanation
of the T‐V Differentiation variable, “To use the T‐V distinction appropriately, the speakers must
pay close attention to the type of their interpersonal relationships with their addressees. This
seems to suggest that people who use a language with multiple yous would be more aware of
status difference.” It is this acknowledgement of status difference that makes this variable a
potentially good instrument for Power Distance. Some examples of this variable can be seen in
English, where there is only one second‐person pronoun (you) and Spanish, where there are
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two second‐person pronoun forms (tu and usted). In the data set 1= 2 PS (there are two
second‐person pronouns) and 0= 1 PS (only 1 second‐person pronoun). Licht et al. (2007) use
this variable as an instrument for their variables Egalitarianism and Hierarchy, which vary
slightly from Power Distance but essentially measure the same thing.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for main variables.

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count

PDI
IDV
UAI
ashock1 totshock2 dgrowth
57.45614 41.5614035 61.68421 6.790355 2.529237 ‐0.00122
2.788837 3.31057559 3.257261 1.039075 0.325145 0.003252
61
36
60
4.502359 1.785168 0.00093
77
20
86
N/A
N/A
N/A
21.05526 24.9942976 24.59178 7.635613 2.454792 0.024553
11
6
8
0.327201 0.232481 ‐0.10765
104
91
112
34.69291 13.63305 0.045028
57
57
57
54
57
57

D. Polity
In order to run a robustness check at the end of the results chapter, polity data will be
used to compare the results from this paper with those found in Rodrik (1999). Polity is
measure of democracy and although Rodrik does not use this exact measure in his article, he
also uses a measure of democracy, so the two are comparable. This measure runs on a scale
from ‐10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic but it has been rescaled from 0 to 1. This
data comes from the Center for Systemic Peace.

E. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the main variables are listed above in table 1. A few
interesting things to note are the standard deviations on the terms of trade shocks, with
ashock1 being much larger than totshock2. This makes sense though, since totshock2 is a

25

measure of standard deviation itself. It also useful to take note of the means of the cultural
variables in order to have a reference point for when the specific scores are discussed in
Chapter Six.

F. Empirical Models
This paper will test the following empirical models using the variables described in the previous
sections in Chapter Four.
1. dGrowth = β0+ β1Shocki+β2Hofstedei+ε
Where Shocki is either ashock1 or totshock2 and Hofstedei is either PDI, IDV or UAI as
defined above.
2. dGrowth = β0+β1Shocki+β2Hofstedei*Shocki+ε
Where Shocki and Hofstedei are defined the same as in model 1.
3. dGrowth = β0+β1Shocki+ β2Hofstedei*Shocki +β3Hofstedei+ε
Where Shocki and Hofstedei are defined the same as in model 1.
4. Hofstedehati= β0+β2Langi+ε (regression 1)
dGrowth = β0+β1Shocki+β2Hofstedehati*Shocki+ε (regression 2)
Where Hofstedehat is the estimated value of either PDI or IDV using the T‐V
Differentiation and Pronoun Drop instruments accordingly. Shocki is defined the same as
in model 1.
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Chapter Five
Empirical Results and Analysis
A. Choosing a Shock
As explained in the Data section, there are two types of shocks used for the regressions
in this paper. The first of which is a percentage change in terms of trade multiplied by the
openness of a country, designed to measure a one‐time terms of trade shock. The periods
chosen for terms of trade are 1975‐1979 and 1980‐1984. The percentage difference between
these periods is multiplied by the average openness from 1975‐1979. The absolute value of this
shock is then taken, which implies that even a positive change in terms of trade has a negative
effect on growth, as discussed in Chapter Three. The absolute value of the shock is also used
since it had a higher t‐stat than the normal shock when regressed on growth. This same type of
shock was examined for the periods 1970‐1974 and 1975‐1979, however none of the results for
the interaction variables turned out to be significant. Since this shock did not contribute
anything to the hypothesis, it was left out of the results. 5 However, it should be noted that the
absolute value of this omitted shock was also more significant than the shock by itself.
The second shock examined is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the first log
differences of the terms of trade from 1971‐1980 and multiplying that value by the average
exports over the period 1970‐1974. This measure is the same as in Rodrik (1999) and is included
for the sake of repetition so that the two sets of results can be compared in the end.

5

Uncertainty Avoidance was significant in the stand alone regressions at the 90% level with a t‐stat of ‐1.81.
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B. Regression Explanations
For the first few sets of regressions, a regular OLS regression is used with the option of
White heteroskedasticity. This option is used in order to improve the measurements of the
standard error. Under the normal OLS regression, there are stringent assumptions about the
covariance and standard error of variables and these assumptions can cause the standard
errors to be biased. By turning on the White heteroskedasticity option, these assumptions are
relaxed, allowing for a non‐linear distribution of standard errors. This option generally improves
the standard error which causes the t‐stats to increase on the variables, while the coefficients
remain constant.
Once the regressions reach the point of instrument inclusion, a Two‐Stage Least
Squared regression is run. Each stage is demonstrated in Chapter Four Section F. There are also
a few more individual regressions run for robustness checks but they are explained as they
appear later in the chapter.

C. Results: A First Glance
This initial section examines correlations between external shocks and growth alongside
culture and growth. The dependent variable in these initial regressions is the difference in the
growth rates from 1960‐1975 and 1975‐1989. The results are displayed in tables 2 and 3. For
the regressions in table 2, there are two independent variables present for every regression,
which are the lagged growth term (growth from 1960‐1975) and the absolute value of
totshock1. Rodrik (1999) includes the lagged growth term in his analysis to allow for
convergence effects and so it is included in these regressions accordingly.
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Table 2: Regression Results using ashock1 and stand alone
cultural variables

constant
1960‐1975
ashock1
IDV
PDI
UAI
N
adj R2

Dependent Variable: Average Growth 1975‐
1989 minus Average Growth 1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.0407
0.0365
0.0434
0.0468
(3.87)
(3.18)
(3.08)
(3.93)
‐0.5227
‐0.5197
‐0.5254
‐0.4886
(‐3.30)
(‐3.28)
(‐3.28)
(‐3.03)
‐0.0010
‐0.0010
‐0.0011
‐0.0011
(‐2.43)
(‐2.53)
(‐2.42)
(‐2.51)
0.0001
(0.91)
‐4E‐05
(‐0.29)
‐0.0001
(‐1.08)
53
0.30

53
0.29

53
0.28

53
0.30

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

Regression one (column 1) shows the effects of an external shock on growth. ashock1 enters
with a negative coefficient and is significant at the 95% level with a t‐stat of ‐2.43. The negative
coefficient was anticipated since this variable is treating all shocks as having a negative effect,
as explained above.
Regression two adds Individualism (IDV) and it enters with a positive coefficient, as
expected, but an insignificant t‐stat of 0.91. The measure of external shocks, ashock1, remains
significant at the 95% level with a negative coefficient and a t‐stat of ‐2.53.
The next regression (shown in column 3) uses the measure of Power Distance (PDI)
instead of Individualism. Power Distance enters with a negative coefficient but is insignificant
with a ‐0.30 t‐stat. External shocks remain significant at the 95% level with a negative
coefficient and t‐stat of ‐2.42.
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Table 3: Regression Results using totshock2 and stand alone
cultural variables

constant
1960‐1975
totshock2
IDV
PDI
UAI
N
adj R2

Dependent Variable: Average Growth 1975‐
1989 minus Average Growth 1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.0538
0.0594
0.0489
0.0608
(5.55)
(5.30)
(3.99)
(5.56)
‐0.6523
‐0.6546
‐0.6453
‐0.6249
(‐5.03)
(‐5.05)
(‐4.93)
(‐4.80)
‐0.0048
‐0.0052
‐0.0049
‐0.0049
(‐4.59)
(‐4.65)
(‐4.61)
(‐4.67)
‐0.0001
(‐1.00)
8E‐05
(0.66)
‐0.0001
(‐1.35)
57
0.40

57

57

57

0.40

0.39

0.41

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

The final regression for this table (shown in column 4) uses the cultural measure of Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI). Uncertainty Avoidance enters with a negative coefficient and is also
insignificant with a t‐stat of ‐1.08. It has the highest t‐stat of all the cultural variables and also
features the highest adjusted R2, with a value of 0.30. The term ashock1 continues to remain
significant at the 95% level with a negative coefficient and a t‐stat of ‐2.51.
Table 3 replicates the regressions run in table 2, with the change that the independent
variable totshock2 (Rodrik’s measure of terms of trade shocks) replaces the term ashock1. As
previously noted, this particular measure of external shocks is designed to measure the effects
of the volatility of terms of trade.
These results are similar to those seen in table 2. None of the stand alone cultural
variables were significant at the 90% level. Uncertainty Avoidance had the highest t‐stat with a
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value of ‐1.35. The coefficient on Individualism switched to negative, which was somewhat
surprising, but with an insignificant t‐stat of ‐1.00 and the fact that this is a stand alone
measure and not interacted with external shocks; it does not present any worrisome problems
for the hypothesis. The coefficient on Power Distance also switched from negative to positive,
but for the same reasons as with Individualism and a t‐stat of 0.66, it is not much cause for
concern. In each of the regressions it is interesting to note that the measure of external shocks,
totshock2, was highly significant at the 99% level and also entered with a negative coefficient in
each case. The adjusted R2 was also about 10% higher in each regression, mainly due to the
higher significance of the external shocks, as the cultural variables had little effect on these
numbers.
While none of these regressions featured a significant cultural variable, it is not a big
concern for this paper since the main hypothesis deals with how culture interacts with external
shocks. That being said, it was definitely unexpected that none of the cultural variables were
significant. Given all of the previously discussed studies that have linked culture and institutions
closely together (with causation running from culture to institutions), it would seem that at
least one if not two or all of the cultural variables would have been significant. The fact that
Rodrik’s (1999) initial regressions showed that measures of institutional quality, such as
institutions (ICRG), democracy and income inequality, were all significant make it hard to
swallow that none of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions were significant.
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Table 4: Regression Results using ashock1 interacted
with culture

Dependent Variable: Average Growth 1975‐
1989 minus Average Growth 1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0397
0.0402
0.0396
constant
(3.40)
(3.38)
(3.04)
‐0.4742
‐0.4959
‐0.5017
1960‐1975
(‐2.67)
(‐2.75)
(‐2.65)
‐0.0033
0.0004
0.0009
ashock1
(‐3.30)
(0.65)
(0.74)
4E‐05
ashock1idv
(3.18)
‐3E‐05
ashock1pdi
(‐1.97)
‐3E‐05
ashock1uai
(‐2.01)
N
adj R2

53
0.37

53

53

0.32

0.32

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

D. Interaction Variables
Next, the core of the hypothesis is tested— culture interacting with external shocks and
the corresponding effects on growth. As above, two different shocks are used and two sets of
interaction variables are created. The first employs the absolute value of the measure
totshock1, focusing on a one time terms of trade shock. The second uses Rodrik’s (1999)
measure of external shocks, focusing on volatility of terms of trade. These regressions also
include the lagged growth term (growth from 1960‐1975) for the same reasons as in the first
set of regressions.
The first regression (shown in column 1 of table 4), shows the results for the
Individualism cultural variable interacted with the absolute value of totshock1. This term enters
with a positive coefficient and is significant at the 99% level with a t‐stat of 3.18. The measure
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Figure 4: A graph of the partial derivative of change in growth with respect to ashock1 vs. Individualism.

of external shocks, ashock1, comes in with a negative coefficient and is significant at the 99%
level with a ‐3.30 t‐stat. The fact that the coefficient on ashock1idv is positive is interesting as
it implies that for high values of Individualism, the shock is completely neutralized. While the
hypothesis proposed that a higher level of Individualism would reduce the impact of the shock,
it did not predict it would do so to this extent.
This idea is fleshed out further in figure 4, which shows a graph of the partial derivative
of the change in growth with respect to the shock. As the graph shows, any country with an
Individualism score over 78 is able to effectively neutralize the shock. These countries are New
Zealand (79), Netherlands (80), Canada (80), United Kingdom (89), Australia (90) and United
States (91). The plausible theory behind these countries being able to neutralize the shock is
that the bargaining parties in these countries enter agreements with their main concern being
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themselves and not larger groups, they are able to make deals quickly and effectively and are
able to successfully combat an external shock and restore growth after a short period. The
same cannot be said for countries like Guatemala that have very low Individualism scores and
are susceptible to slower growth after an external shock. In fact, it is possible to calculate the
growth collapses that different countries could experience by taking the standard deviation of
ashock1 (7.636) and multiplying it by the coefficient found for each country. Using some
examples from Figure 4, Guatemala could experience a growth collapse of 2.3%, while a growth
collapses in Japan would only be at most 1.0% and even less in South Africa, with 0.4%. These
results demonstrate how important Individualism may be.
The second regression in Table 4 shows the effect of Power Distance interacted with
ashock1. This term enters with a negative coefficient and is significant at the 90% level (just
missing 95%) with a t‐stat of ‐1.97. In this regression ashock1 surprisingly enters with a positive
coefficient and is insignificant with a t‐stat of 0.65. The logic following this seems to be that the
external shock itself does not present a significant threat to a country’s growth, but when a
shock occurs in a country that has a medium to high PDI, it can cause a growth collapse. This
idea is further demonstrated in Figure 5. On this graph, the y‐intercept is actually positive, but
the trend line quickly dips below the x‐axis into negative growth for any value of Power
Distance above 13. The only countries that are able to stay out of the negative growth range
are Austria (11) and Israel (13). Thus, according to these initial regressions, almost every
country will experience a period of decreased growth following an external shock, and
countries that have a higher PDI will experience a greater growth collapse. In the case of
Malaysia, with a 104 PDI score, the growth decline could be as large as 2.1% when assuming a
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Figure 5: A graph of the partial derivative of change in growth with respect to ashock1 vs. PDI.

shock of one standard deviation. Some other examples from Figure 5 are France with a possible
decline of 1.3% and Sweden with a smaller decline of 0.4%.
The last regression (shown in column 3), displays the interaction between ashock1 and
the Uncertainty Avoidance cultural variable. The coefficient on this term is negative and
significant at the 95% level with a t‐stat of ‐2.01. The measure of external shocks, ashock1,
enters with a positive coefficient and is insignificant with a t‐stat of 0.74. The fact that the
coefficient for the interaction term is negative is surprising, as the hypothesis predicted that it
would actually be positive.
As shown for the other two measures, Figure 6 displays the graph of the partial
derivative of the change in growth with respect to ashock1 versus Uncertainty Avoidance. This
graph takes a similar form to the graph in Figure 5 for Power Distance. This is not what was
expected given the logic entertained in the hypothesis. The theory surrounding Uncertainty
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Figure 6: A graph of the partial derivative of change in growth with respect to ashock1 vs. UAI.

Avoidance was that people in countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance would want to make
deals more quickly since they would want to eliminate uncertainty. This would have translated
to a better handling of external shocks as the Uncertainty Avoidance score increased. Given
these results though, Greece, the country with the highest Uncertainty Avoidance score, could
theoretically experience a growth collapse of up to 2.0%, while Thailand would only suffer a
collapse of 0.9% and China a miniscule 0.1%.
For the second set of regressions (displayed in table 5), Rodrik’s measure of shocks,
totshock2, was interacted with the cultural variables Individualism, Power Distance and
Uncertainty Avoidance. The results in these regressions were similar to those with the stand
alone cultural variables, none of the interaction variables turned out to be even close to
significant. The variable that was closest to being significant was shock2pdi, which only had a
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Table 5: Regression Results using totshock2 interacted
with culture

Dependent Variable: Average Growth 1975‐
1989 minus Average Growth 1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0541
0.0531
0.0537
constant
(5.51)
(5.42)
(5.49)
1960‐
‐0.6505
‐0.6402
‐0.6493
1975
(‐4.97)
(‐4.86)
(‐4.95)
‐0.0045
‐0.0067
‐0.0041
totshock2
(‐2.91)
(‐2.13)
(‐1.59)
‐1E‐05
shock2idv
(‐0.30)
3E‐05
shock2pdi
(0.63)
‐1E‐05
shock2uai
(‐0.31)
N
adj R2

57
0.39

57

57

0.39

0.39

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

t‐stat of 0.63. It is interesting to note that in this set of regressions, the coefficients involving
Individualism and Power Distance switch signs, so that Individualism is negative and Power
Distance is positive. This is contrary to the hypothesis presented in this paper. It is also
surprising that none of the variables turned out be significant. For similar reasons as mentioned
in the discussion regarding table 3, it would seem that given Rodrik’s findings of multiple
institutional variables being significant, that at least one of the cultural variables would also be
significant seeing as institutions and culture are correlated.

E. Instrument Inclusion
While the results presented above are interesting, particularly those regarding
Individualism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance interacting with the onetime shocks,
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Table 6: Regression results for linguistic
Instrument inclusion

Dependent Variable: Avg. Growth
1975‐1989 minus Avg. Growth
1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
0.0570
0.0394
constant
(3.89)
(0.40)
‐0.2969
‐0.1712
1960‐1975
(‐1.71)
(‐0.36)
‐0.0065
0.0066
ashock1
(‐4.29)
(0.45)
0.0001
ashock1idv
(3.60)
‐0.0006
idv
(‐2.75)
‐0.0002
ashock1pdi
(‐0.58)
‐0.0002
pdi
(‐0.13)
N

48

48

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

they are subject to endogeneity issues. Are these growth collapses explained by culture and its
interaction with external shocks? Or, has the culture of different countries been formed by the
growth rates that they experience? In order to control for this problem, linguistic instruments
from Kashima and Kashima (1998) are included in a Two‐Stage Least Squares regression for the
variables Individualism and Power Distance. A suitable instrument for Uncertainty Avoidance
could not be found. Table 6 displays the results of these regressions.
Column 1 features the results of using Pronoun Drop as an instrument for Individualism.
As the results show, the theory regarding Individualism continues to hold up when controlling
for the endogeneity of culture. The ashock1idv variable enters with a positive coefficient and is
significant at the 99% level with a t‐stat of 3.60. Individualism and the measure of external
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shocks, ashock1, both enter with negative coefficients and are significant at the 99% level as
well.
Column 2 displays the results of using T‐V Differentiation as an instrument for Power
Distance. Unfortunately, these results do not still hold in the presence of an instrument. None
of the variables are significant, though the ashock1pdi does have a negative coefficient, as
expected. However, these results may not be significant because the instrument being used is
poor.
In order to determine whether these instruments were viable, each instrument was
regressed on the cultural variable that it was sought to measure. When Pronoun Drop was used
as the independent variable for a regression with Individualism as the dependent variable, the
t‐stat was highly significant with a value of ‐7.63. Also,the F‐stat was 58.17, assuring its viability.
On the other hand, when regressing T‐V Differentiation on Power Distance, the t‐stat
was still significant at the 95% level with a value of 2.21, but the F‐stat was only 4.87, well
below level of at least 8 that is desired for an instrument. Thus, the failure of Power Distance to
stand up to a Two‐Stage Least Squares regression may largely be a result of the poor
instrument used. Unfortunately, given the fact that it came from the field of psychology and not
economics, it is difficult to find a suitable alternative.

F. Robustness
In order to ensure that none of the variables that we found to be significant suffer from
the omitted variable bias, the regressions with the interaction variables are re‐run in order to
include the stand alone cultural variables. Although Rodrik (1999) does not do this in his article,
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Table 7: Regression results including stand alone
cultural variables with interaction variables

Dependent Variable: Avg Growth 1975‐1989
minus Avg Growth 1960‐1975
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.0467
0.0261
0.0386
constant
(3.37)
(1.98)
(2.13)
‐0.4578
‐0.4661
‐0.5052
1960‐1975
(‐2.67)
(‐2.62)
(‐2.71)
‐0.0042
0.0010
0.0014
ashock1
(‐3.16)
(1.71)
(0.59)
0.0001
ashock1idv
(3.05)
‐0.0002
idv
(‐1.37)
‐0.0001
ashock1pdi
(‐2.26)
0.0002
pdi
(1.34)
‐3E‐05
ashock1uai
(‐1.33)
2E‐05
uai
(0.10)
N
adj R2

53

53

53

0.38

0.33

0.31

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses

it is an important thing to check to ensure that results are non‐spurious. Table 7 shows these
results. It is clear that the term ashock1uai did not pass the test and was significant previously
due to the omission of the stand alone variable uai. The new t‐stat on ashock1uai is ‐1.33,
which is insignificant. On the other hand, both the variables ashock1idv and ashock1pdi stand
up to this test. The term ashock1idv enters with a highly significant t‐stat of 3.05, significant at
the 99% level. ashock1pdi is also still significant at the 95% level, with a t‐stat of ‐2.26. So while
ashock1uai did not stand up to this test, the other two variables did. Given the fact that
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Table 8: A correlation matrix between the cultural variables.

PDI
PDI
IDV
UAI

1
‐0.66516
0.07298

IDV
1
‐0.17434

UAI

1

ashock1uai had the opposite sign on the coefficient as predicted, it is not that surprising that it
did not survive this test.
In order to further check the robustness of these findings, Individualism and Power
Distance must be analyzed to show that they are actually two different variables and not just
essentially measuring the same thing twice. In order to do this, a regression using both
ashock1idv and ashock1pdi is run and a correlation matrix is calculated. The results of these
tests show that Power Distance and Individualism are in fact highly correlated. As seen in the
correlation matrix (table 8), IDV is negatively correlated with PDI by 66.5 percent. The results of
the regression show a similar phenomenon. The t‐statistic of ashock1pdi becomes insignificant
(value is 0.72) when in the presence of ashock1idv, meaning that the two are correlated enough
for ashock1idv to explain most of what ashock1pdi was explaining. The variable ashock1idv
remains significant at the 95% level (almost 99% level), with a t‐stat of 2.54.
While Hofstede had mentioned in Culture’s Consequences (2001) that Power Distance
was negatively correlated with Individualism, he did not specify to the extent that these
variables were correlated and had made no other mention that they might be as closely
correlated as they turned out to be. The implications of this are both disappointing, yet
intriguing at the same time. It means that only one of the three variables tested in the
hypothesis turned out to have the characteristics that were initially predicted, and since
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Individualism clearly cannot encompass every cultural aspect of a country, it means that culture
may not have as large a role as initially believed. On the other hand however, the fact that
Power Distance and Individualism are so closely correlated—with Individualism being highly
significant in every regression and Power Distance significant in most—shows that Individualism
likely does have a substantial impact on the way that countries handle external shocks. The
ways in which countries can utilize this information for their own benefit is outlined in the next
Chapter.

G. Rodrik Comparison
In order to compare Rodrik’s findings to the results found in this paper, a measure of
polity was interacted with ashock1 (to form ashock1dem) and tested in the same regression as
Individualism and Power Distance. The results are displayed below in table 9. Column 1 shows
the results for a regression featuring ashock1idv and ashock1dem. In this regression, ashock1idv
has a t‐stat of 1.94, which is significant at the 90% level and almost at the 95% level.
Meanwhile, ashock1dem has a t‐stat of only 0.55, which is insignificant. This tells us that
Rodrik’s findings of democracy being significant are likely just a product of democracy being
correlated with Individualism (they are 63% correlated). This is not surprising given the
previously discussed literature on culture relating to institutions, such as Tabellini (2008), Licht
et al. (2007) and more. Furthermore, it shows that culture directly alters economic growth and
is not simply a channel to growth through institutions. More studies like these could help show
a causation running from culture to growth and help end the long debate over whether culture
or institutions effect growth more.
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Table 9: Regression results comparing
interaction variables for culture and democracy

Dependent Variable: Avg Growth
1975‐1989 minus Avg Growth 1960‐
1975
(1)
(2)
0.0413
0.0370
constant
(3.81)
(3.45)
‐0.5130
‐0.4917
1960‐1975
(‐2.97)
(‐2.81)
‐0.0031
‐0.0021
ashock1
(‐3.14)
(‐1.89)
4E‐05
ashock1idv
(1.94)
3E‐05
0.0001
ashock1dem
(0.55)
(2.39)
2E‐05
ashock1pdi
(0.83)
N
adj R2

51
0.43

51
0.41

Coefficients are listed, t‐stat in parentheses
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
These results show that culture may have a larger influence on economic growth after
external shocks than previously believed. In particular, it shows that Individualism likely plays a
larger role than Rodrik’s proposed variable of institutions of conflict management. The fact that
Individualism remained significant even in the presence of democracy also indicates the
possibility that democracy only effects growth through its influence on culture.
The policy implications that can be derived from these results are fairly limited in scope.
For instance, countries cannot simply institute policies that change their culture in order to be
less vulnerable to growth collapses resulting from external shocks. However, what these results
do provide is some insight into the weaknesses that certain countries face when attempting to
stabilize after external shocks. By knowing their weaknesses, countries with lower Individualism
scores can create preemptive plans to help them deal with external shocks. One example could
be emergency laws that the country must undertake in the presence of a shock in order to
execute the “textbook” adjustments that were discussed in Chapter 1. This would help to
eliminate the human element and significantly decrease the adjustment time. (Coming up with
the laws that would be enacted would be a whole other issue though). Another possible
solution could be to have all countries with low Individualism scores create a bi‐partisan council
that advises the governments on which policies to follow when dealing with external shocks.
This council would have to be made up of people from many different countries though in
order to ensure bi‐partisanship and that the bargaining time would actually decrease.
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It is also important to note that most of the countries with low Individualism scores and
high Power Distance scores are in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. Meanwhile, the
countries with high Individualism scores and low Power Distance scores are mostly in North
America, Western Europe and the Australia region. While many of the Latin American, Middle
Eastern and Asian countries have been growing faster than those with high Individualism scores
and low Power Distance scores recently, it does not mean that this theory is implausible. It is
likely that if a major shock hits those countries with low Individualism scores and high Power
Distance scores that they may experience a Japan‐like growth collapse and take a while to
recover.
There is still a good bit of work to be done in order to fully determine which elements
interact with external shocks to cause growth collapses. Though democracy was tested against
culture, this measure of democracy was not the exact one that Rodrik used, nor were the other
variables that he tested compared to culture. In order to fully establish which channels effect
growth the most, all cultural, institutional and conflict variables must be tested. There may also
be other variables that were not proposed in either Rodrik’s article or this paper that may play
a significant role when interacted with external shocks. Also, these results would benefit from
an increased number of observations. Given that Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions only included
80 observations and that terms of trade data from the 1960s was also fairly limited, the largest
sample size for any of the regressions turned out to be 57. While this is comparable to Rodrik’s
number of observations, there are still almost 150 countries that go unaccounted for. In order
to rely on the accurateness of these findings, the number of observations would ideally be
increased through extensions in Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions and better terms of trade data.
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